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How can our experience in developing and operating the International Space Station 
(ISS) guide the design, development, and operation of life support for the journey to Mars? 
The Mars deep space Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) must 
incorporate the knowledge and experience gained in developing ECLSS for low Earth orbit, 
but it must also meet the challenging new requirements of operation in deep space where 
there is no possibility of emergency resupply or quick crew return. The understanding 
gained by developing ISS flight hardware and successfully supporting a crew in orbit for 
many years is uniquely instructive. Different requirements for Mars life support suggest that 
different decisions may be made in design, testing, and operations planning, but the lessons 
learned developing the ECLSS for ISS provide valuable guidance. 
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SSF = Space Station Freedom 
TCCS = Trace Contaminant Control Subassembly 
UPA = Urine Processor Assembly 
WPA = Water Processor Assembly 
WRS = Water Recovery System 
I. Introduction 
HE space station program is described and compared to a Mars mission. The development of the space station 
and its life support system is discussed. A long table lists the International Space Station (ISS) lessons learned 
that have been published. The table is organized in the areas of approach, design, commonality, complexity, 
reliability, diverse redundancy, testing, test on orbit, operations, maintenance, and lower level repair. Some major 
lessons learned and important problems are further discussed.  
How, taking account of the ISS lessons learned, can we best develop life support for deep space and the journey 
to Mars?  
II. Space station life support and the Journey to Mars 
NASA’s “Journey to Mars” report explains the agency’s approach to human exploration and developing space 
technology. (NASA, Oct. 15, 2015) Dava Newman gave an overview of the NASA Journey to Mars,  
“(W)e’re on the space station in low Earth orbit now. We have to get to cislunar space before getting to Mars. 
Mars is the horizon goal. With Mars as a horizon goal, we’re trying to be clear and concise about what we’re 
learning on space station about buying down risk for human health and our technology investments. The end 
goal is Mars, and if you have your end goal as Mars, then I think we can work backwards so that our Mars 
requirements really inform what we’re doing in deep space. … We have nine more years [on space station] to 
keep buying down human health risk and technology risk. In deep space, it’s about technology investments, and 
these technologies are completely tied into the mission to Mars. … So we have to have a really good prioritized 
list of what are the technology investments that we’re making, that we can invest in, that will help us get to 
Mars.” (Foust, Nov.16, 2015)  
 
Using the space station for developing technology for Mars is a major NASA priority for the Journey to Mars, 
and life support system technology investment is key in buying down risk for human health. The “Journey to Mars” 
report notes that,  
“NASA will have to learn new ways of operating in space, based on self-reliance and increased system 
reliability; … and the ability to design, build, or repair systems with common, modular components. … We do 
this by designing a resilient architecture that focuses on critical capabilities across a range of potential missions, 
investing in technologies that provide large returns, and maximizing flexibility and adaptability through 
commonality, modularity, and reusability.” (NASA, Oct. 15, 2015)  
 
The report specifically mentions using the space station to advance Environmental Control and Life Support 
Systems (ECLSS) to enable deep-space, long-duration Mars missions.  
“The ISS is the only microgravity platform for the long-term testing of new life support and crew health systems, 
advanced habitat modules, and other technologies needed to decrease reliance on Earth. Over the next decade, 
we will validate many of the capabilities needed to maintain a healthy and productive crew in deep space. 
Currently manifested or planned experiments and demonstrations include improved long-duration life support 
for Mars missions.” (NASA, Oct. 15, 2015)  
 
In addition to the lessons already learned for Mars on the space station, more research and development and 
future lessons learned are planned.  
III. The space station and the Mars mission 
The International Space Station (ISS) is the most complex engineering project in history and the most expensive 
single item ever built. It is the largest and longest inhabited structure that humans have ever put into space. The cost 
of the ISS is about $150 billion, including $50 billion for space shuttle launches. It weighs nearly one million 
pounds and has been continuously occupied since November 2, 2000. (Wikipedia, International Space Station)  
  
T 
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The space station is a fabulous human accomplishment. But how does it help us get to Mars? Human space 
habitats are vaguely similar to those on Earth. Just as automobiles and trucks provide transportation and houses are 
for permanent residence, crew launch systems are used for transportation and space stations or planetary bases are a 
place to stay. And both on Earth and in space, there are hybrid systems for transportation and brief residence. A 
terrestrial recreational vehicle or motor home, like the space shuttle, would typically be lived in for days, weeks, 
possibly stretching to months, but not for only a few hours or for many years. The space station will be lived in until 
2024, a total of 24 years, and has the nature and requirements of a permanent residence. A Mars mission will 
probably use different transit and surface habitats, and the time spent in each will be between one and two years. 
This means that Mars life support will have requirements and design solutions influenced by both crew launch 
systems and the space station. Since the Mars mission duration is between the shuttle and space station mission 
durations, it may use a combination of shuttle and space station life support methods.  
The ISS is in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), at about 248 miles above the Earth’s surface. Mars is 140 million miles 
away at its furthest distance on the far side of the sun. Mars is roughly a million times further away than ISS. The 
travel time to ISS is a day or two, while the travel time to Mars is about 200 to 250 days, roughly a hundred times 
longer. No resupply or on-demand return to Earth is possible from Mars.  
A major goal for ISS is developing and maturing the enabling science and technology for future human space 
exploration missions beyond LEO. This should be reflected in aggressive efforts to advance ISS regenerative life 
support systems and, where appropriate, to explore alternatives. 
IV. The development of the space station and long duration life support 
The US began the development of Space Station Freedom (SSF) in the 1980’s. After the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, SSF was merged with the on-going and future plans for Mir to become the International Space Station (ISS). 
A. Space Station Freedom (SSF) to International Space Station (ISS)  
After the Apollo moon landing, NASA proposed developing many programs including a space shuttle, a series 
of large space stations, more missions to the moon, a lunar base, and an initial mission to Mars in the 1980s. 
President Nixon wanted to reduce the budget priority of space missions and asked NASA to pick one of the many 
possible programs. The two most urgent were the space shuttle and space station, but the space shuttle was 
considered higher priority to be funded first since it would be needed to build the space station. President Nixon 
approved the development of the space shuttle in January 1972. 
The space station had to wait until the space shuttle was flying. President Reagan approved the space station 
during his 1984 State of the Union address and design efforts began. President Bush endorsed completing Space 
Station Freedom (SSF) as part of the Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) in 1989, in a speech marking the 20th 
anniversary of the Apollo 11 landing.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union reduced the political support for SSF and increased efforts to cut its capabilities 
and cost. In 1990 SSF was found to be over budget, over weight, and underpowered. An analysis by Fisher and Price 
found that on-orbit assembly would require an impossible amount of ExtraVehicular Activity (EVA). A revised 
1991 space station design had greatly reduced capabilities.  
In June 1993, space station funding was retained in NASA appropriations by a single vote in the House. Later 
that year, NASA and the Russian Space Agency agreed to combine SSF and the on-going Russian Mir 2 program. 
President Clinton accepted the proposal and Russia became a full partner in the renamed International Space Station 
(ISS). (Logsdon, 2008) (Encyclopedia Astronautica, Space Station Freedom) (Encyclopedia Astronautica, 
International Space Station)  
B. Long duration life support 
Short duration missions from before Apollo to the space shuttle used open loop life support systems. Carbon 
dioxide was removed by lithium hydroxide canisters, trace contaminants by activated charcoal, and humidity by a 
condensing heat exchanger and water separator. Oxygen was supplied by high pressure tanks and water by fuel cells 
or tanks. (Eckart, 1996) (Wieland, 1994)  
Decades before they occurred, it was realized that long missions would consume very large amounts of lithium 
hydroxide, activated charcoal, oxygen, and water and that closed loop recycling life support would be needed. Initial 
closed loop ECLSS development and testing began in the 1960’s. Three closed chamber manned tests of 30, 60, and 
90 days were conducted in 1965, 1968, and 1970 by McDonnell Douglas. The equipment was similar in all three 
tests but upgraded and redesigned for later tests. The subsystems used were similar to those ultimately flown on ISS, 
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and included a molecular sieve to remove carbon dioxide, a Sabatier reactor to convert carbon dioxide to water, a 
water electrolysis unit to produce oxygen, humidity concentrate multifiltration, and a urine vacuum distillation 
system. (Eckart, 1996) (Wieland, 1994)  
For the 90-day test, the crew remained in full isolation with no resupply of spares, tools, or expendables. All 
maintenance and repair were performed by the crew. It was noted that the crew operations, maintenance, and repair 
were effective and often ingenious. Integrated tests produced results that were not obvious in subsystem studies or 
component tests. (Pearson and Grana, 1971) 
C. ISS and life support launch 
Russia's Zarya module was the first ISS module, launched on Nov 20, 1998. It was quickly followed by the 
Node 1 Unity U.S. module, and there are now about eighteen pressurized modules and structures, not including 
visiting vehicles. The station has been continuously occupied since Nov. 2, 2000. The ISS Atmosphere 
Revitalization System (ARS), mostly housed in the Atmosphere Revitalization (AR) rack, contains a Carbon 
Dioxide Removal Assembly (CDRA), a Trace Contaminant Control Subassembly (TCCS), and a Major Constituent 
Analyzer (MCA). They have been operating on board ISS since 2001. The full redundant AR rack was launched on 
STS-128 in 2009. The Oxygen Generating System (OGS) was delivered in 2006 and began operation in the U.S. 
Laboratory module Destiny in 2007, then moved over to Node 3 Tranquility in February 2010 along with the Water 
Recovery System (WRS) racks. The WRS consists of a Urine Processor Assembly (UPA) and a Water Processor 
Assembly (WPA). The WRS was initially operated in 2008 in Destiny and is now in Tranquility. The Sabatier was 
installed in the OGS rack in Tranquility in 2010.  
V. Lessons learned from the International Space Station (ISS) Environmental Control and Life 
Support System (ECLSS) 
Many papers describe the history of ISS and some specifically list lessons learned. A consolidated list of lessons 
learned has been compiled to help explain how the ISS ECLSS experience can help guide life support development 
for a mission to Mars.  
A. Table of lessons learned from ISS ECLSS development and operations  
Table 1 lists lessons learned from ISS ECLSS. Each line represents one lesson learned given by a single source, 
and is a close paraphrase or quotation of the original. It was felt that presenting the original lessons learned without 
rewriting or combining them gave a more accurate impression of the writer’s original intent. The lessons learned 
have some repetition and overlap, but not as much as could be expected.  
The table of ISS ECLSS lessons learned includes 74 items from 15 different sources. It is organized in the areas 
of approach, design, detailed design, commonality, complexity, reliability, diverse redundancy, testing, test on orbit, 
operations, maintenance, and lower level repair.  
 
Table 1. Lessons learned from ISS ECLSS.  
Area Lesson learned Reason Reference 
Approach 
 Additional investments in ECLSS are 
needed 
Current ECLS systems do not meet the 
requirements of deep space  
(Guirgis et al., 
2014-233)  
 Enabling technology (especially ECLSS) 
needs to be developed 
The ISS ECLSS technology is less than 
adequate for some planned operational 
scenarios 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Reduce size, mass, and power ISS hardware can be generally characterized 
as big, heavy and power hungry systems 
(Guirgis et al., 
2014-233)  
 
Optimize system loop closure Cost increases rapidly with degree of 
system loop closure 
(Guirgis et al., 
2014-233)  
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Area Lesson learned Reason Reference 
Approach, continued 
 Consider alternate technologies to ISS 
ECLSS  
Alternate technologies could have reduced 
power, reduced mass, less complexity and 
greater reliability 
(Guirgis et al., 
2014-233)  
 Design trade-offs must address 
competing or conflicting higher-level 
goals and objectives 
The Concept of Operations should address 
all areas including logistics, maintenance, 
stowage, utilization, habitability, and 
operations. 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 The U.S. and Russians have different 
hardware design philosophies 
The Russians use heritage hardware, the 
U.S. hardware has little heritage and is more 
complex 
(Sanchez and 
Voss, 2005-705) 
 Encourage expressing dissenting 
opinions 
Many difficult technical issues will surely 
arise 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
Design 
 Allow sufficient time for flight hardware 
development 
Can underestimate the effort and time 
needed to take development hardware to 
flight  
(Carrasquillo, 
2005-0337) 
 Allow time for redesign Success oriented schedules can neglect potential problems and rework 
(Carrasquillo, 
2005-0337) 
 Allow mass growth for safety and hazard 
control 
Sensors and effectors added to meet safety 
and hazard requirements may grow a 
subsystem by 50%  
(Carrasquillo, 
2005-0337) 
 Pay attention to interfaces ISS ECLSS is an integrated system (Bazley, 2015) 
 Hardware must be modifiable for an 
unanticipated space environment  
The space environment is not fully known 
until it is experienced 
(Sanchez and 
Voss, 2005-705) 
 Attempt to minimize spares Much mass and volume is required for 
system spares  
(Sanchez and 
Voss, 2005-705) 
 Use miniaturization carefully Miniaturization can increase complexity and 
make maintenance difficult 
(NRC, 2012) 
 Be careful even with small changes Small design changes can cause big problems 
(Carrasquillo, 
2005-0337) 
 Be careful even with small components Small, ancillary components can present the greatest challenges 
(Carrasquillo, 
2005-0337) 
Detailed design 
 Provide for storage of excess water Needed for system failure or water imbalance 
(Bazley, 2015) 
 Provide universal hose interfaces Needed for contingency connections (Bazley, 2015) 
 Water types should be compatible and 
mixable 
The many water types on ISS make transfer 
and storage difficult 
(Shkedi, 2008-
01-2008)  
 Store water outside the vehicle wherever 
possible 
Water storage requires volume and handling  (Shkedi, 2008-
01-2008)  
 Pay attention to dust production and 
accumulation 
Dust contamination is a common issue in 
ISS 
(Parodi et al, 
2013-3414) 
Commonality 
 Use commonality Commonality reduces the number of spares 
and tools 
(NRC, 2012) 
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Area Lesson learned Reason Reference 
Commonality, continued 
 Have robust systems that can be repaired 
with common parts and tools 
Future missions will be even more 
constrained in logistics and stowage 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Require commonality in low level parts, 
connectors, components, and interfaces 
Almost no standardization requirements 
were levied on ISS 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Maximize commonality for fasteners, 
batteries, etc. 
Commonality reduces storage and increases 
operational efficiency 
(Bertels, 2006-
5952) 
 Balance diverse redundancy and 
commonality 
Diversity improves reliability but adds 
maintenance and logistics complexity 
(Gentry, 2013) 
 Balance diverse redundancy and 
commonality 
Redundancy reduces common cause failures 
but increase parts counts  
(Gatens, 2015) 
    
Complexity 
 Reduce design and interface complexity Lower complexity improves reliability, 
maintainability, and operability 
(Jordan, 2009-
6791) 
 Reduce complexity The more complex a technology, the more 
prone it will be to failures 
(Carrasquillo et 
al., 2004-01-
2385) 
Reliability 
 Highly robust systems are needed in 
deep space  
Issues continue with elements of the ISS life 
Support hardware 
(Harding and 
Bergin, 2015) 
 Deep space technology, especially life 
support, must be ultrareliable and 
thoroughly tested to determine failure 
modes and their repair approach 
The CDRA has failed often  (Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Improve ECLSS to be “as close to 100 
percent reliable as possible and/or easily 
repairable.” 
“Current ISS experience with both U.S. and 
Russian ECLSS systems shows significant 
failure rates that would be unacceptable for 
an extended human exploration mission.” 
(NRC, 2012) 
 Develop more reliable systems to reduce 
redundancy 
Redundancy requires mass, volume, and 
logistics  
(Carrasquillo et 
al., 2004-01-
2385) 
 Increase MTBF accuracy by improving 
hardware reliability and testing 
MTBF is used to determine the needed 
number of spares 
(Bertels, 2006-
5952) 
 Design systems to have 
compartmentalized, non-cascading 
failure modes 
Cascading failures can overwhelm 
emergency response procedures and backup 
systems 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Carefully choose between reliability, 
repair, and replacement  
The trade space includes crew training, 
crew time, ground support, stowage, 
logistics, and cost. 
(Sanchez and 
Voss, 2005-705) 
Diverse redundancy 
 Provide redundancy of critical systems Redundancy allows continued operation 
during contingencies 
(Bazley, 2015) 
 Provide diverse redundant systems For failures and contingencies (Bazley, 2015) 
 Implement dissimilar redundancy in life 
support 
U.S. and Russian segments of the ISS 
provide dissimilar redundancy in life 
support systems. 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 7 
International Conference on Environmental Systems 
Area Lesson learned Reason Reference 
Diverse redundancy, continued 
 Use dissimilar redundancy appropriately Dissimilar redundancy provides additional 
mission assurance by avoiding common 
failure modes but adds additional cost, mass 
and complexity 
(Guirgis et al., 
2014-233)  
 Use unlike redundancy along with 
demonstrated high reliability for critical 
systems 
Common cause failures defeat similar 
redundancy.  
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
Testing 
 Test thoroughly Discover failure modes and design errors (Gatens, 2015) 
 Perform end-to-end, multi-element, 
system level testing 
Testing identified multiple problems that 
would have been difficult or impossible to 
remedy on-orbit.  
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Conduct high fidelity, integrated, 
system-level, end-to-end testing 
Inadequate testing will make the crew rely 
on potentially flawed spares and risky in-
flight repair, potentially endangering the 
crew 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 The importance of testing must be 
stressed  
Budget issues always end up limiting the 
scope and duration of test programs  
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Provide budget and schedule for 
sufficient testing  
Testing reduces operational problems and 
total mission cost 
(Gatens, 2015) 
 Use the protoflight approach carefully The protoflight approach can increase schedule and cost risk 
(Carrasquillo, 
2005-0337) 
Test on orbit 
 Mature technology by ground test and 
in-space operation 
The use of protoflight ECLSS on the ISS 
has resulted in extensive on-orbit repairs  
(Hodgson et al., 
2012) 
 Perform significant testing on the ground 
and ISS 
Testing needed for reliable ECLS systems 
for multi-year missions 
(Guirgis et al., 
2014-233)  
 Test systems on orbit Systems on orbit act differently than on the 
ground 
(Parodi et al, 
2013-3414) 
 Test in operational environment Many problems seen only in actual environment, e.g., 0 g 
(Gatens, 2015) 
 Actual on-orbit system use can differ 
from expected 
For example, higher urine calcium levels 
occurred on-orbit as compared to ground 
(Gentry, 2013) 
Operations 
 Consider operations in design Cutting costs up front can make operations 
more difficult, increase the life cycle costs, 
and lead to critical safety issues 
(Jordan, 2009-
6791) 
 Be careful changing operational systems Changes cause “unintended consequences” (NRC, 2012) 
 Be aware of conflict between design and 
operations  
Conflicting needs or concerns naturally 
exist and require balance 
(Jordan, 2009-
6791) 
 Perform telemetry data trend analysis  Data trends can help predict problems (Parodi et al., 
2013-3414) 
Maintenance 
 Provide easy access to ORUs Easy access needed for crew maintenance (Jordan, 2009-
6791) 
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Area Lesson learned Reason Reference 
Maintenance, continued 
 Provide easy accessibility to ORUs Substantial amounts of crew time are 
required for on-orbit maintenance  
(Bertels, 2006-
5952) 
 Provide easy access to filters Easy access needed for crew maintenance (Jordan, 2009-
6791) 
 Be aware of microbial and fungal growth Biofilm can clog water flow paths and 
storage vessels. 
(Gentry, 2013) 
 Hardware must support field diagnosis 
and repair 
Significant crew time is required to 
maintain hardware that was not designed for 
on orbit repair 
(Sanchez and 
Voss, 2005-705) 
 Hardware should be designed for human 
operations and maintenance 
Crews can effectively deal with hardware 
problems 
(Sanchez and 
Voss, 2005-705) 
 Maintenance in deep space must be 
performed with equipment on board 
There is no possibility of a resupply ship 
providing additional hardware  
(Harding and 
Bergin, 2015) 
 Design for availability Availability is the product of balanced 
reliability and maintainability 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Design for maintenance without 
extensive ground support 
Ground support communications will have 
variable multi-minute delays 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Design for maintainability, minimizing 
the number of individual parts, number 
of steps, and time-to-repair 
The exercise treadmill motor repair required 
removing and replacing over 100 individual 
screws. 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Enable the crew to repair by crew 
selection and training and by providing 
tools and parts 
Crew repair has been successful and is the 
last resort 
(Lengyel and 
Newman, 2014) 
 Gain operational experience Operational experience is necessary to 
understand maintainability  
(Carrasquillo et 
al., 2004-01-
2385) 
 Design systems to be replaceable or 
repairable on-orbit 
Even the best designs can experience 
failures 
(Shkedi, 2008-
01-2008)  
 Provide tools, materials, and equipment 
to respond to unexpected failures 
Non-ORU failures occur and require more 
complex repairs 
(Bertels, 2006-
5952) 
Lower level maintenance 
 Devise ways to perform lower level 
maintenance 
ORUs have high launch mass and repair 
only one failure 
(Shkedi, 2008-
01-2008)  
 Use lower level replacement parts for 
deep space 
Big and complex ORUs are not suitable for 
deep space packaging or sparing 
(Guirgis et al., 
2014-233)  
 Develop Intermediate-level (I-level) 
maintenance capabilities, meaning ORU 
sub-component repair 
I-level maintenance will reduce spares mass 
and volume but take more time and be more 
complex  
(Bertels, 2006-
5952) 
B. Discussion of the table of lessons learned from ISS ECLSS development and operations  
The table of lessons learned seems to give a reasonable and consistent picture of the development and operation 
of the ISS ECLSS. The lessons learned fall into a dozen familiar areas, but these simply follow the normal course of 
space program development from design through operations, maintenance, and repair. The lessons learned are 
consistent with each other and reflect well-known history.  
Typically each particular lesson learned stresses one particular concern. Lessons learned tend to be simple direct 
statements, “Do this,” or “Don’t do that,” but there are always limits, costs, and complications. Systems engineering 
tells us that we must balance different and often conflicting goals and values. Trade-offs and compromises must 
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always be made. Some lessons learned do reflect this, using the words, “along with,” “balance,” “trade-offs,” and 
“optimize.”  
VI. Discussion of some lessons learned about ISS ECLSS 
Table 1 of ISS ECLSS lessons learned includes twelve areas: approach, design, detailed design, commonality, 
complexity, reliability, diverse redundancy, testing, test on orbit, operations, maintenance, and lower level repair. 
Further comments are made on the six more difficult of these areas, which are approach, reliability, diverse 
redundancy, testing, maintenance, and lower level repair.  
A. Approach 
Lessons learned listed under “Approach” suggested that ISS ECLSS needs to be improved for Mars, and 
especially that its mass and volume must be reduced. It was mentioned that the U.S. and Russians have different 
hardware design philosophies 
1. The ISS ECLSS needs improvement 
 A paper by ISS ECLSS team members written before the ISS regenerative ECLSS was launched suggests that 
improvements in the ISS ECLSS are needed. 
“The baseline environmental control and life support (ECLS) systems currently deployed on board the 
International Space Station (ISS) and that planned to be launched in Node 3 are based upon technologies selected in 
the early 1990’s. While they are generally meeting or exceeding requirements for supporting the ISS crew, lessons 
learned from years of on orbit and ground testing, together with new advances in technology state of the art, and the 
unique requirements for future manned missions prompt consideration of the next logical step to enhance these 
systems to increase performance, robustness, and reliability, and reduce on orbit and logistical resource 
requirements.” (Carrasquillo et al., 2004-01-2385) 
The problems cited for the ISS ECLS include high power consumption, difficult maintainability and logistics, 
sensitivity of several components to particulates and fouling, gravity related problems in multi-phase fluid flow and 
separations, and the lack of fine particle settling in microgravity. There are potential improvements in robustness, 
performance efficiency, and expanded capability. These can be obtained by a more integrated design approach and 
by “a focused, functionally-based systems engineering approach to specifying the ECLS system and developing the 
process design.” (Carrasquillo et al., 2004-01-2385) 
2. ISS ECLSS rack packaging and mass 
One lesson was that, “ISS hardware can be generally characterized as big, heavy and power hungry systems.” 
(Guirgis et al., 2014-233) The major ISS modules were designed to fly on the Space Shuttle and used a modular 
system of interchangeable racks attached to four utility standoffs. Using ISS racks “imposes unnecessary mass 
penalties” for use beyond LEO “because of the additional structure required for each rack and the complex 
distribution of utilities necessary to supply all racks.” (Smitherman et al., 2012)  
The purpose of recycling oxygen and water is to save the cost of launching their mass into orbit. Recycling 
systems are justified on ISS by showing that the mass of the oxygen or water they produce over their ten or fifteen 
year operational life would be ten or twenty times larger than the mass of the recycling systems themselves. 
However, Mars transit and long surface stay missions have a much shorter duration than ISS, typically from one to 
one and a half years. This means that the current ISS recycling systems if used for Mars would produce materials 
having only one or two times their own mass in oxygen and water. The ISS rack structure is not suitable for Mars. 
While most subsystems still show a benefit on paper, the mass advantage will be further eroded by added 
redundancy and sparing needs to ensure crew survival on Mars missions where prompt return or unanticipated 
resupply are impossible. One must strive to maximize mass benefits by minimizing weight, volume and spares 
needed for the regenerative systems that would leave LEO. 
3. The Russian design heritage approach  
It has been noted that, “the Russians do not need to plan as extensively for failures because they do not use as 
much new technology.” (Patterson, 2001) The Russians use more heritage hardware. (Sanchez and Voss, 2005-705) 
And, “Americans need to plan extensively for failures because new technology is widespread. … The reliability of 
many items is unknown and reactions to failures must be heavily preplanned. … the implementation of so much new 
technology at one time has never before been attempted in space.” (Patterson, 2001) It should also be noted Russian 
systems historically had no means of being returned for failure investigation and therefore Russian engineers had 
limited insight into how to improve the existing designs. Simply providing enough spares to cover failures is not 
really an option outside of LEO and each failure must be understood to improve the reliability of each design. The 
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ISS’s engineers access to failed hardware returned from orbit has had immense value in helping to understand and 
correct issues. The Russians have had to do without this capability through much of their their manned space 
program. For both Russian and US systems, on-orbit diagnosis has inherent imitations that impede design evolution 
to increase maturity and drive out failures. The Russian use of heritage designs would tend to reduce ECLSS 
failures, but does not appear to achieve the dramatic reductions that might be anticipated under more ideal 
conditions.  
B. Reliability 
ISS ECLSS reliability has been much lower than anticipated. Russell and Klaus state “total ECLSS maintenance 
for 865 days was found to exceed the design estimate by a factor of 22.” A contributing factor was the oxygen 
generation system’s greater than expected failure rate. (Russell and Klaus, 2007) Failures continue at different rates 
for different subsystems. Some have had no dramatic maturity increase or significant reliability growth, others such 
as the oxygen generation system have had high early failures and then operated well, and several have run almost 
flawlessly for fifteen years. (Hodgson et al., 2013-3409) (Jones, 2014-075). Improved reliability would be a benefit 
for ISS and is even more needed for Mars.  
C. Diverse redundancy 
Using diverse redundancy at the system level is an alternate approach to using Orbital Replacement Units 
(ORUs) or lower level spare parts, but they can be combined. It may be that different systems and different 
technologies require different approaches, either repair or redundancy. Common cause failures can defeat 
redundancy. Common cause failures can disable all of a large set of identical parts or systems. Using diverse 
redundant systems is an important way to achieve reliable space life support. (Jones, 2015-047) However, it has high 
overhead. Diverse redundancy requires multiple development projects, different kinds of spares, tailored operating 
procedures and crew training, and probably unique integration configurations. It opposes the use of commonality to 
reduce sparing mass penalties and enhance reparability. As systems are operated on ISS, the common cause failure 
modes are discovered and can be corrected by redesign. Achieving the required reliability for Mars could require a 
mix or choice between redesign for reliability, similar redundancy, and diverse redundancy. The best approach 
would depend on when the costs of reducing common cause failures in a single design sufficiently exceed those of 
implementing two or more diverse designs. 
D. Testing 
Many of the lessons learned cited above deal with testing for regenerative life support systems. In some cases 
they reinforce the importance of things that were done in developing the ISS regenerative life support systems. 
Lengyel and Newman, for example, stress that integrated, end-to-end system level testing is essential and point out 
that it uncovered significant issues that would have been very difficult to correct on-orbit (and potentially fatal in a 
Mars mission without a capability for effective ground based hardware support). (Lengyel and Newman, 2014). In 
others, they suggest the need for more or different testing including reconsideration of the use of protoflight 
approaches (Carrasquillo, 2005-0337) (Hodgson et al., 2012), or the addition of space-based testing to traditional 
ground based test programs (Hodgson et al., 2012), (Guirgis et al., 2014-233), (Parodi et al., 2013-3414), (Gatens, 
2015), (Gentry, 2013). One can hardly be surprised at these suggestions given the incidence of early failures or 
degraded performance in many of the regenerative ECLSS subsystems on ISS. While these issues have been 
successfully addressed on ISS, the ground support and resupply activities that enabled resolution would not have 
been possible in a Mars mission, and some of the issues that arose would certainly have threatened crew survival. 
Together ISS experience and these testing lessons learned suggest that improved ECLSS testing is essential if we are 
to achieve the levels of system reliability and the knowledge of sparing requirements needed for a successful human 
mission to Mars. 
The critical questions that ECLSS testing in support of a Mars mission must answer include all of those 
traditionally addressed in flight qualification – operational performance, compatibility with mission environments 
and interfaces, endurance through the anticipated mission lifetime, etc., but also include or significantly expand 
several others. To support a Mars mission, we will need to know in advance how likely component or subsystem 
failures are, where they are most likely to occur and what spares and maintenance provisions will be needed to 
ensure life support availability throughout the mission. The test program must also tell us how long life support 
systems may be unavailable while under repair and what expendable inventories are required during those intervals 
and provide the data needed to ensure that the probability of an unrecoverable failure is low enough to support crew 
survival goals for the mission. 
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The lessons learned listed above point out that successfully answering these questions requires a rigorous 
integrated test program pursued over time in appropriate testing environments. As suggested in several lessons 
learned, a rigorous test program requires integrated testing to ensure that system level effects are properly reflected 
in the mature design. It also requires thorough understanding of failures and issues that arise from engineering 
evaluation of failed components to determine failure causes and mechanisms, as a basis for eliminating them where 
practical and for assessing the potential for common mode failures across redundant items. In order to establish 
sufficient knowledge of failure rates to assure crew survival goals are met, testing will need to represent many times 
the operating time on a Mars mission. While this may be achieved by operating multiple parallel units, the duration 
for each individual unit needs to exceed planned mission operating times to ensure that life related issues (e.g. wear-
out, corrosion, biofilm development, etc.) are addressed. ISS experience suggests that appropriate testing 
environments for ECLSS must include testing in space. Several of the issues with ISS ECLSS subsystems that were 
not identified in ground test programs were the direct result of differences between the space operating environment 
and ground test environments. Differences that proved critical include microgravity, differences in atmospheric 
composition, and differences in crew waste composition. In some of these cases, ground test environments could 
have been adjusted based on available data given enough engineering insight and imagination and would then have 
produced test results that identified the failures and allowed their elimination before flight. However, taken as a 
whole, the ISS ECLSS experience suggests that the interactions between systems as multivariate and complex as 
those in a regenerative ECLSS and an occupied human spacecraft will demand testing in the actual space flight 
environment before the level of reliability and knowledge of maintenance provisioning needs required for long 
human missions beyond LEO are achieved. 
Another lesson that may be taken from the ISS ECLSS experience is that in a long complex mission like a 
human flight to Mars, the probability of unanticipated problems will always be high. In addition its obvious design 
implications – design for maintainability, commonality, etc., to maximize response options – this implies that test 
programs to support such missions should yield residual operational hardware on Earth or in earth orbit (ideally 
both) that can be used to support the mission crew in analyzing and responding to ECLSS issues that were not 
explicitly addressed in crew training, maintenance planning, and spares provisioning. 
In addition to providing the lessons learned cited here and driving the regenerative ECLSS maturation already 
accomplished, ISS can be a crucial enabling platform for the rigorous, integrated, extended, space-based testing .that 
is needed to get us safely to Mars. With planned operation to 2024 and possible program extensions, ISS provides at 
least eight more years of space operational experience with regenerative ECLSS technologies and systems. Benefits 
for Mars can be maximized through a concerted effort to expand what we have learned taking full advantage of the 
increased down-mass capability afforded by the Dragon capsule. Still more can be learned by flying replacement or 
parallel ECLSS hardware that incorporates design lessons learned and is as close to Mars mission designs as 
possible within ISS integration constraints during that time frame. 
Further opportunities may avail themselves with NASA’s efforts to establish a cis-lunar outpost “proving 
ground” for next generation or Mars-bound ECLS upgrades or new technologies. Likewise any efforts by U.S. or 
International partners to return to the lunar surface would also be an excellent opportunity to trial run any Mars 
surface technologies that vary from ISS designs due to the available and sometimes useful gravity component.  
E. Maintenance 
The ISS maintenance approach using ORUs been considered a problem for ISS and for future missions.  
1. The ISS Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) approach. 
ISS ORUs are removed and replaced on-orbit either in Preventative Maintenance (PM) if they have a limited 
operational life or for Corrective Maintenance (CM) to replace any that fail. The ISS has more than 5,700 ORUs and 
hundreds of thousands of spare parts that are supplied by nearly 200 manufacturers. (Soldon, 2004) 
ISS maintenance uses ORUs, but the usual term in the military is Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). LRUs are 
modular and interchangeable. They improve system availability because they can be stocked and replaced quickly 
on site. In some cases Lower Level Replaceable Units (LLRUs) are provided to quickly repair an LRU. LRUs must 
be specifically designed and are often supported by tools, test procedures, and training. Parts, boards, assemblies, 
and components may be used to repair LRUs but are not considered LRUs. (Wikipedia, Line replaceable unit) 
The definition and design of the LRUs and the selection of the appropriate level of repair are difficult systems 
design issues. The most obvious factor to consider is the cost or, for space, the launch mass required to achieve the 
reliability needed. But other non-economic issues can be controlling, such as down time, manpower, ability to test 
and diagnose, difficulty of repair, risk of damage, transportation and storage, and the tools and test equipment 
required. (Parada Puiga and Bastena, 2014) (MSFC-HDBK-3074) (Patterson, 2001)  
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2. The Russian maintenance design approach  
The Russian Space Agency (RSA) has had a different approach to maintenance. The RSA approach for MIR and 
ISS is to replace a failed ORU by a spare ORU provided by a Progress re-supply flight. The RSA has had limited 
down-mass, preventing sending ORUs to Earth for repair. Little mass can be returned on Soyuz and Progress burns 
up in re-entry. The space shuttle allowed ground servicing of US ORUs. It has been noted that, “the Russians do not 
need to plan as extensively for failures because they do not use as much new technology.” (Patterson, 2001) The 
Russians use more heritage hardware. (Sanchez and Voss, 2005-705) And, “Americans need to plan extensively for 
failures because new technology is widespread. … The reliability of many items is unknown and reactions to 
failures must be heavily preplanned. … the implementation of so much new technology at one time has never before 
been attempted in space.” (Patterson, 2001) The U.S. process of returning and repairing ORUs has provided 
information about their designs and where improvements are needed to increase reliability. 
F. Lower level repair 
There are usually three levels of maintenance; organizational, intermediate, and depot. Organizational 
maintenance usually consists of actions to remove and replace (R&R) LRUs. Intermediate repair facilities can use 
test equipment and spare parts stocks to handle simple common failures. Furthest back from operations, at repair 
depots or even manufacturers’ sites, maintenance can include complex repairs, overhauls, and design modifications. 
(Wikipedia, Level of repair analysis) 
The ISS uses standard three level maintenance. Organizational maintenance is corrective maintenance by on-orbit 
ORU removal and replacement or preventative maintenance through scheduled change out of ORUs. Intermediate 
maintenance is corrective maintenance to disassemble and repair ORUs. It has been done successfully several times 
on ISS, although obtaining scarce crew time is difficult. Depot maintenance is corrective maintenance at a NASA 
depot or manufacturer’s facility to repair broken ORUs or spare parts that cannot be fixed at the other maintenance 
levels. (Soldon, 2004) (Patterson, 2001)  
The ISS ORU repair approach is not thought to be feasible beyond LEO. (Bertels, 2006-5952) Lower level repair 
should be considered. “Alternate concepts of operation must be explored in which required spare parts, materials, 
and tools are made available to make repairs; the locations of the failures are accessible; and the information needed 
to conduct repairs is available to the crew.” (Cirillo et al., 2011-7231)  
VII. Conclusion 
Developing and operating the International Space Station (ISS) and the ISS Environmental Control and Life 
Support System (ECLSS) has been a fantastic endeavor. The lessons learned with the ISS ECLSS so far are a critical 
step on our journey to Mars that will influence our approach to ECLSS design, reliability, redundancy, testing and 
maintenance for that mission. They make it clear that we have a sound technology foundation for the ECLSS we 
will require and also unmistakably show how much remains to be accomplished. ISS has clearly demonstrated the 
need to make regenerative ECLSS smaller, lighter, and more robust and reliable than we have achieved in the ISS 
systems. Experience on board has demonstrated both the value and the costs of diverse redundancy in regenerative 
life support and provides important guidance for design trade-offs for future Mars missions. ISS experience in 
introducing many new regenerative life support systems into operational use in space has shown some of the 
limitations in the ground based test programs used to develop and certify them and reinforced prior lessons learned 
about the crucial importance of integrated testing and truly representative test environments. These strongly indicate 
that Mars mission ECLSS should be subjected to extended operational tests in space to ensure the crew's safe return 
to Earth. ISS experience has also reinforced the importance and value of engineering evaluation of failed hardware 
to enable increases in reliability and robustness and the urgent need for a robust down-mass capability to allow 
engineering evaluation without the time and resource constraints placed on flight crew. Invaluable experience in 
ECLSS maintenance has been gained and will guide improved designs for maintainability and enhanced 
maintenance operations planning for the Mars mission ECLSS. 
ISS contributions to the development of a Mars mission ECLSS are far from complete. With eight more years of 
planned crewed operations, more essential experience in regenerative life support in the unique spacecraft 
environment is inevitable. It is of crucial importance that we make the effort to maximize the value of this 
opportunity by seizing every opportunity to learn from the continued operation of current systems and, where 
possible, to add experience with updated and upgraded systems that are closer to those that will take us to Mars. 
Likewise when a cis-lunar facility is created and humans return to the lunar surface, foremost in the engineer’s 
minds during the design and deployment of the ECLS systems should be the intention to prove out the technologies 
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for Mars in the closest possible analog environments before the commitment to the “all in” Trans-Mars-Injection 
thruster burn! 
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